黑客免杀攻防_黑客可以在半英里外使用胰岛素泵杀死糖尿病患者-嗯,不。 事实与新闻恐惧之间的冲突...

黑客免杀攻防

黑客免杀攻防_黑客可以在半英里外使用胰岛素泵杀死糖尿病患者-嗯,不。 事实与新闻恐惧之间的冲突...

UPDATE: Jay Radcliffe, the researcher discussed in this post, has emailed me, a little upset. In the interest of transparency I've included our email thread at the end of this post so that Jay's perspective on any inaccuracies may be seen. I encourage you to draw your own conclusions.

更新:本文中讨论的研究员Jay Radcliffe给我发了电子邮件,有点不高兴。 为了透明起见,在这篇文章的末尾添加了我们的电子邮件主题,以便可以看到Jay对任何不准确之处的看法。 我鼓励您得出自己的结论。

There's a story making the rounds on Twitter right now. Engadget "reports" researcher sees security issue with wireless insulin pumps, hackers could cause lethal doses.

现在有一个故事在Twitter上进行。 Engadget的“报告”研究人员发现无线胰岛素泵存在安全问题,黑客可能会造成致命剂量

Wait till you see what researcher and diabetic Jay Radcliffe cooked up for the Black Hat Technical Security Conference. Radcliffe figures an attacker could hack an insulin pump connected to a wireless glucose monitor and deliver lethal doses of the sugar-regulating hormone.

等到您看到研究人员和糖尿病患者Jay Radcliffe为Black Hat技术安全会议做了什么 拉德克利夫(Radcliffe)认为,攻击者可能会入侵连接到无线葡萄糖监测器的胰岛素泵,并释放致死剂量的糖调节激素。

First, a little on my background. I've been Type 1 diabetic for 17 years. I've worn an insulin pump 24 hours a day, 7 days a week for over 11 years and a continuous glucose meter non-stop for over 5 years. I also wrote one of the first portable glucoses management systems for the original PalmPilot over 10 years ago and successfully sold it to a health management company. (Archive.org link) I also interfaced it (albeit with wires) to a number of portable glucose meters, also a first.

首先,关于我的背景。 我患有1型糖尿病已有17年了。 我已经每周11天,每天24小时,每天24小时佩戴胰岛素泵,并且连续5年以上不间断地使用血糖仪。 我还于10年前为原始的PalmPilot编写了首批便携式葡萄糖管理系统之一,并将其​​成功出售给一家健康管理公司。 ( Archive.org链接)我也将它(尽管有电线)连接到了许多便携式血糖仪,这也是第一个。

Engadget's is a mostly reasonable headline and accurate explanation as they say he "figures an attacker could..." However, Computerworld really goes all out with the scare tactics with Black Hat: Lethal Hack and wireless attack on insulin pumps to kill people.

Engadget的标题大体上是合理的标题,而且解释准确,因为他们说他“知道攻击者可以...”。但是,Computerworld确实采用了Black Hat的恐吓策略:致命的Hack和对胰岛素泵的无线攻击来杀死人

Like something straight out of science fiction, an attacker with a powerful antenna could be up to a half mile away from a victim yet launch a wireless hack to remotely control an insulin pump and potentially kill the victim.

就像科幻小说中的某些东西一样,拥有强大天线的攻击者可能距离受害者不到半英里,但却发起了无线黑客攻击,以远程控制胰岛素泵并可能杀死受害者。

The only thing that saves this initial paragraph is "potentially." The link that is getting the most Tweets is VentureBeat's "Excuse me while I turn off your insulin pump," a blog post that is rife with inaccuracies (not to mention a lot of misspellings). Here's just a few.

保存此初始段落的唯一内容是“可能”。 获得最多Tweets的链接是VentureBeat的“打扰我,请关闭我的胰岛素泵”,这是一篇博客文章,其中充斥着错误信息(更不用说很多拼写错误了)。 这只是几个。

  • "Insulin pumps use wireless sensors that detect blood sugar levels and then communicate the data to a screen on the insulin pump."

    “胰岛素泵使用无线传感器检测血糖水平,然后将数据传送到胰岛素泵的屏幕上。”

    • Way too broad. Pumps don't. Some CGMs (continuous glucose meters) communicate with special integrated pumps. The most popular integrated system is a Medtronic Paradigm. Most other CGM system have a separate "screen" device that's separate from the pump.

      方式太广泛了。 泵不行。 一些CGM(连续血糖仪)与专用的集成泵通信。 最受欢迎的集成系统是Medtronic范例。 大多数其他CGM系统具有与泵分开的单独的“筛网”设备。

    "Insulin pumps use wireless sensors that detect blood sugar levels and then communicate the data to a screen on the insulin pump."

    “胰岛素泵使用无线传感器来检测血糖水平,然后将数据传送到胰岛素泵的屏幕上。”

  • "The sensor has to run on a 1.5-volt watch battery for two years."

    “传感器必须在1.5伏的手表电池上运行两年。”

    • Nope. The Medtronic receiving sensor needs to be charged ever 3 to 6 days. The pump battery is usually a AAA that lasts a few weeks.

      不。 Medtronic接收传感器需要每3至6天充电一次。 泵电池通常为AAA,可持续数周。

      Nope. The Medtronic receiving sensor needs to be charged ever 3 to 6 days. The pump battery is usually a AAA that lasts a few weeks. UPDATE: The Dexcom receiver is recharged every 3 days but the body transmitter is warrented for a year with a small watch battery.

      不。 Medtronic接收传感器需要每3至6天充电一次。 泵电池通常为AAA,可持续数周。 更新:Dexcom接收器每3天充电一次,但身体发射器需要使用小型手表电池才能使用一年。

    "The sensor has to run on a 1.5-volt watch battery for two years."

    “传感器必须在1.5伏的手表电池上运行两年。”

One useful paragraph in the VentureBeat post points out again that Jerome wasn't able to decode the message. Here, emphasis mine.

VentureBeat帖子中的一个有用段落再次指出,Jerome无法解码该消息。 在这里,强调我的

Then Radcliffe went through the process of deciphering what the wireless transmissions meant. These transmissions are not encrypted, since the devices have to be really cheap. The tranmissions [sic] are only 76 bits and they travel at more than 8,000 bits per second. To review the signal, Radcliffe captured the signal with a $10 radio frequency circuit board and then used an oscilloscope to analzye [sic] the bits.

然后,拉德克利夫(Radcliffe)经历了解密无线传输含义的过程。 这些传输未加密,因为设备必须非常便宜。 传输[sic]仅为76位,并且每秒传输的速率超过8,000位。 为了查看该信号,Radcliffe用一个10美元的射频电路板捕获了该信号,然后用示波器对这些位进行了分析。

He captured two 9-millisecond transmissions that were five minutes apart. But they came out looking like gibberish. He caputred [sic] more transmissions. About 80 percent of the transmissions had some of the same bits. He reached out to Texas Instruments for help but didn’t have much luck. He told the TI people what he was doing and they decided not to help him.

他捕获了两次相距五分钟的9毫秒传输。 但是他们出来看起来像胡言乱语。 他限制了更多的传输。 大约80%的传输具有某些相同的位。 他向德州仪器(TI)寻求帮助,但运气不佳。 他告诉TI人员他在做什么,他们决定不帮助他。

That was as far as he got on deciphering the wireless signal from the sensor, since there was no documentation that really helped him there. He couldn’t understand what the signal said, but he didn’t need to do that. So he tried to jam the signals to see if he could stop the transmitter. With a quarter of a mile, he figured out he could indeed mess up the transmitter via a denial of service attack, or flooding it with false data.

直到他开始破译来自传感器的无线信号为止,因为那里没有任何文档可以真正帮助他。 他无法理解信号的含义,但是他不需要这样做。 因此,他试图阻塞信号以查看是否可以停止发送器。 在四分之一英里的距离内,他发现自己确实可以通过拒绝服务攻击或用虚假数据淹没发送器来弄乱发送器。

黑客免杀攻防_黑客可以在半英里外使用胰岛素泵杀死糖尿病患者-嗯,不。 事实与新闻恐惧之间的冲突...

Now, to the security issue. One has to read these articles and blog posts very carefully. It's easy Link Bait to say "A hacker can kill diabetics wirelessly without them knowing it!" (I assume we'd figure it out at some point, though.) While Jerome Radcliffe, the gentleman who did the proof of concept, is no doubt very clever, the folks who are blogging this fear mongering should do their homework and read the details. Jerome is presenting some of his findings at the BlackHat conference. Here's his abstract with emphasis mine. Note also that SCADA means "supervisory control and data acquisition." He's saying that we "cyborgdiabetics" (my term) are human control and data acquisition systems as data-in/control-out controls our health, well-being and ultimately our lives.

现在,要解决安全问题。 人们必须非常仔细地阅读这些文章和博客文章。 Link Bait很容易说“黑客可以在不知道的情况下无线杀死糖尿病!” (不过,我认为我们会在某个时候解决这个问题。)尽管进行概念验证的绅士杰罗姆·拉德克利夫无疑很聪明,但在博客中发牢骚恐慌的人们却应该做功课并阅读细节。 Jerome在BlackHat会议上介绍了他的一些发现。 这是他的重点摘要。 还请注意,SCADA的意思是“监督控制和数据获取”。 他说我们的“ cyborgdiabetics”(我的术语)是人类控制和数据采集系统,因为数据输入/输出控制我们的健康,福祉并最终控制我们的生活。

As a diabetic, I have two devices attached to me at all times; an insulin pump and a continuous glucose monitor. This combination of devices turns me into a Human SCADA system; in fact, much of the hardware used in these devices are also used in Industrial SCADA equipment. I was inspired to attempt to hack these medical devices after a presentation on hardware hacking at DEF CON in 2009. Both of the systems have proprietary wireless communication methods.

作为糖尿病患者,我一直都在连接两个设备。 胰岛素泵和连续血糖监测仪。 这些设备的组合使我变成了人类SCADA系统。 实际上,这些设备中使用的许多硬件也用于工业SCADA设备中。 在2009年DEF CON上关于硬件黑客的演讲之后,我受到启发去尝试对这些医疗设备进行黑客攻击。这两个系统都具有专有的无线通信方法。

Could their communication methods be reverse engineered? Could a device be created to perform injection attacks? Manipulation of a diabetic's insulin, directly or indirectly, could result in significant health risks and even death. My weapons in the battle: Arduino, Ham Radios, Bus Pirate, Oscilloscope, Soldering Iron, and a hacker's intuition.

他们的通信方法可以反向工程吗? 是否可以创建一个执行注入攻击的设备? 直接或间接操作糖尿病患者的胰岛素可能会导致严重的健康风险,甚至死亡。 我在战斗中使用的武器:Arduino,Ham Radios,Bus Pirate,示波器,烙铁和黑客的直觉。

After investing months of spare time and an immense amount of caffeine, I have not accomplished my mission. The journey, however, has been an immeasurable learning experience - from propriety protocols to hardware interfacing-and I will focus on the ups and downs of this project, including the technical issues, the lessons learned, and information discovered, in this presentation "Breaking the Human SCADA System."

在花了几个月的业余时间和大量的咖啡因之后,我还没有完成我的任务。 但是,这次旅程是一次无与伦比的学习经历-从适当的协议到硬件接口-我将在此演示文稿中重点介绍该项目的起伏,包括技术问题,经验教训和发现的信息。人类SCADA系统。”

Just to be clear, Jerome has not yet successfully wirelessly hacked an insulin pump.

需要明确的是,杰罗姆(Jerome)尚未成功通过无线方式入侵胰岛素泵。

UPDATE: See below email thread. Jerome says he can change settings and pause the pump. This may be via the USB wireless interface one uses to backup settings and send their blood sugar to their doctor. That's an educated guess on my part.

更新:请参阅下面的电子邮件线程。 Jerome说他可以更改设置并暂停泵。 这可能是通过USB无线接口进行的,该接口用于备份设置并将其血糖发送给医生。 就我而言,这是有根据的猜测。

He's made initial steps to sniff wireless traffic from the pump. I realize, as I hope you do, that his abstract isn't complete. Hopefully a more complete presentation is forthcoming. I suspect he's exploiting the remote control feature of a pump. This is a key fob that looks like a car alarm beeper that some pump users use to discretely give themselves insulin doses. However, I feel the need to point out as a pump wearer myself that:

他已采取初步步骤来嗅探泵的无线流量。 正如我希望的那样,我意识到他的摘要还不完整。 希望即将有更完整的演示。 我怀疑他正在利用泵的远程控制功能。 这是一个钥匙扣,看起来像是汽车警报器,某些泵用户用来离散地给自己注射胰岛素。 但是,我觉得有必要自己作为泵的使用者指出:

  • Not every Insulin Pump has a remote control feature.

    并非每个胰岛素泵都具有远程控制功能。
  • Not every remote-controllable insulin pump has that feature turned on. Mine does not, for example.

    并非每个远程可控胰岛素泵都已启用该功能。 例如,我的不是。

In this AP article reposted at NPR called Insulin Pumps, Monitors Vulnerable To Hacking they give us more of the puzzle which confirms that Jerome was - in at least one hack attempt - using the optional remote control feature of the pump. A feature that few turn on. Their tech is a little off as well with talk of a 'USB device,' probably an Arduino with an RF shield.

在NPR上重新发布的这份名为《胰岛素泵》的AP文章中,监视器容易受到黑客攻击,它们给了我们更多的困惑,这证实了杰罗姆-至少是在一次黑客尝试中-使用泵的可选远程控制功能。 很少打开的功能。 关于“ USB设备”(可能是带有RF屏蔽的Arduino)的谈论,他们的技术也有所欠缺。

Radcliffe wears an insulin pump that can be used with a special remote control to administer insulin. He found that the pump can be reprogrammed to respond to a stranger's remote. All he needed was a USB device that can be easily obtained from eBay or medical supply companies. Radcliffe also applied his skill for eavesdropping on computer traffic. By looking at the data being transmitted from the computer with the USB device to the insulin pump, he could instruct the USB device to tell the pump what to do.

拉德克利夫(Radcliffe)戴着胰岛素泵,可与特殊的遥控器配合使用来管理胰岛素。 他发现可以对泵进行重新编程以响应陌生人的遥控器。 他所需要的只是一个可以从eBay或医疗用品公司轻松获得的USB设备。 拉德克利夫(Radcliffe)还运用了他的技巧来窃听计算机流量。 通过查看通过USB设备从计算机传输到胰岛素泵的数据,他可以指示USB设备告诉泵做什么。

黑客免杀攻防_黑客可以在半英里外使用胰岛素泵杀死糖尿病患者-嗯,不。 事实与新闻恐惧之间的冲突...

Finally, another piece of the puzzle is found at SCMagazine's scary "Black Hat: Insulin pumps can be hacked" article where they open with:

最后,在SCMagazine的可怕的《黑帽:胰岛素泵可以被黑客入侵》一文中找到了另一个谜题,这些文章的开头是:

"A Type 1 diabetic said Thursday that hackers can remotely change his insulin pump to levels that could kill him."

“一名1型糖尿病患者周四表示,黑客可以远程将他的胰岛素泵更改为可能杀死他的水平。”

ZOMG! Someone can remotely control my insulin pump? They continue...

ZOMG! 有人可以远程控制我的胰岛素泵吗? 他们继续...

"Radcliffe, now 33, explained that all he requires to perpetrate the hack is the target pump's serial number."

“现年33岁的拉德克利夫(Radcliffe)解释说,要进行骇客入侵他所需要做的就是目标泵的***。”

Oh, you mean the serial number that I use to pair with the transmitter to use the highly touted remote control function? This is like saying "I can open your garage door with a 3rd party garage door opener. Just give me the numbers off the side of your unit..."

哦,您是说我用来与发射器配对以使用高度吹捧的遥控功能的***吗? 这就像在说“我可以用第3方车库门开启器打开你的车库门。只要给我我单位侧面的号码即可...”

What Jerome has done, however, is posed a valid question and opened a door that all techie diabetics knew was open. It is however, an obvious question for any connected device. Anyone who has ever seen OnStar start a car remotely knows that there's a possibility that a bad guy could do the same thing.

然而,杰罗姆(Jerome)所做的事情被提出了一个有效的问题,并打开了所有技术糖尿病患者都知道是敞开的大门。 但是,对于任何已连接的设备,这都是一个显而易见的问题。 任何曾经看过OnStar远程开车的人都知道,坏人有可能做同样的事情。

For example, literally last month I personally exchanged emails with a friendly hacker who successfully hacked the web services for the Filtrete Touchscreen WiFi-enabled Thermostat. Harmless? Perhaps, but his hack could successfully remotely control a furnace or AC in the house of anyone with this device. Any control device that's connected to the "web" or even "the air," in the case of insulin pumps, is potentially open for attack.

例如,从字面上看,上个月我亲自与一位友好的黑客交换了电子邮件,该黑客成功地**了Filtrete触摸屏WiFi恒温器的Web服务。 无害? 也许可以,但是他的黑客可以成功远程控制使用此设备的任何人的房屋中的熔炉或交流电。 在胰岛素泵的情况下,连接到“网络”或什至“空气”的任何控制设备都可能受到攻击。

I appreciate the message that Jerome is trying to get out there. Wireless medical devices need to be designed with security in mind. I don't appreciate blogs and "news" organizations inaccurately scaring folks into thinking this is a credible threat.

我赞赏杰罗姆(Jerome)试图走到那里的消息。 无线医疗设备在设计时必须考虑安全性。 我不喜欢博客和“新闻”组织不当地使人们误以为这是可信的威胁。

We don't know what brand pump was experimented on, and fortunately the gentleman isn't giving away the technical details. If you are a diabetic on a pump who is concerned about this kind of thing, my suggestion is to turn off your pump's remote control feature (which is likely off anyway) and turn off your sensor radio when you are not wearing your CGM. Most of all, don't panic. Call the manufacturer and express your concern. In my experience, pump manufacturers do not mess around with this stuff. I'm not overly concerned.

我们不知道使用哪种牌子的打气筒,幸运的是这位先生没有透露技术细节。 如果您是患有这种疾病的泵的糖尿病患者,我的建议是关闭泵的远程控制功能(无论如何可能会关闭),并且在您不穿着CGM时关闭传感器无线电。 最重要的是,不要惊慌。 致电制造商并表达您的关注。 以我的经验,泵制造商不会把这些东西弄乱。 我不太担心。

All this said, I'd love to have him on my podcast. If you're reading this and you're Jerome Radcliffe, give me a holler and let's talk tech.

这么说,我很想让他参加我的播客 如果您正在阅读本文,并且您是Jerome Radcliffe,请给我一个空谈,让我们谈谈技术。

Of course, all this talk would be moot if we cured diabetes. In encourage you to give a Tax Deductable Donation to the American Diabetes association: http://hanselman.com/fightdiabetes/donate

当然,如果我们治愈糖尿病,所有这些谈话都是没有意义的。 为了鼓励您向美国糖尿病协会提供免税捐赠: http : //hanselman.com/fightdiabetes/donate

Also, feel free to show people my "I am Diabetic. Here's how it works" educational video on YouTube with details on how I setup a pump and continuous glucose monitoring system every 3 days. http://hnsl.mn/iamdiabetic takes you right to the YouTube video.

此外,请随时向人们展示我的“我是糖尿病患者。这是它的工作原理”在YouTube上的教育视频,其中包含有关我每三天如何设置泵和连续葡萄糖监测系统的详细信息。 http://hnsl.mn/iamdiabetic带您直接观看YouTube视频。

UPDATE: In the interest in full disclosure, here is my email thread with Jay. As I've said, I'm happy to update the article, as am I doing here, with all perspectives. This was as much a blog post about the media and that meta-point as it was about the tech. Given that I had to piece this post together from several other posts and articles just to get an idea of what the big picture is, kind of makes my point about the problems of hyperbole in the media. Again, my concern is more about sensationalism than it is about the tech. I have no doubt a pump CAN be hacked. Any connected device can be hacked.

更新:为了全面公开,这是我给杰伊的电子邮件线索。 正如我已经说过的,我很高兴以各种观点来更新本文,就像我在这里所做的一样。 这既是关于媒体的博客文章,也是关于技术的元论点。 鉴于我不得不将本文章与其他几篇文章和文章拼凑在一起,只是为了了解整体情况,因此我对媒体夸张问题提出了自己的看法。 再说一次,我的关注点更多是耸人听闻,而不是技术。 我毫不怀疑泵会被黑客入侵。 任何连接的设备都可以被黑客入侵。

Here's our thread from earliest to latest:

这是我们最早到最新的话题:



From: Jerome Radcliffe

I *can* hack an insulin pump. I can suspend it, change all the settings remotely. I did that on stage. I'm quite disappointed that you did not verify any of the information in your article. People do die from hypoglycemia. Is it an extreme example? Yes. It needs to be. These devices need to be researched for security flaws. To talk about why someone might hack a pump misses the point.

From: Scott Hanselman

I'm sorry, I only found the articles I linked to, plus the abstract that said you hadn't. I tried to verify everything to the best of my ability to Google. Would you send me some newer links and I'llr update my post? My post was meant as an analysis of the news coverage more than the attack. Send me new info?

Thanks!

From: Jerome Radcliffe

I understand your position. but as a blogger/journalist there is a certain level of responsibility to publishing facts. You come off as hypocritical blaming the media for being inaccurate on diabetics being killed by pumps, and write a piece riddled with inaccuracies on my research.
1. There is a CGM that runs on a 1.5v battery for two years. You state that my research is wrong. It is not.
2. Check CBS in las Vegas's web site. They have a video of the demo. Several media outlets reported that demo.
My name is fairly unique and my email address is easy to acquire. I would have rather you contact me for clarification rather then publish a critique of my research that is far from accurate.


From: Scott Hanselman

A random blogger and a trained journalist are certainly different things, I'm sure we can agree on. I do certainly want to improve the post and add the facts and am more than happy to do so.
I'm not sure where I said "your research is wrong" in my post, but I will re-check it. Again, most of my post is quotes from actual journalists who presumably interviewed you and I quoted them. I also quoted your black hat abstract.
I searched twitter for Jay and Jerome Radcliffe but didn't find you and wasn't able to find your blog, I suppose because of the flood of new links and stories.
This CGM runs for 2 years without recharging? Perhaps I'm confused about semantics. I've had a number of CGMs, some 1.5V and all the ones with embedded batteries needed recharging. I'll check around. Again, however, my assertion wasn't against you at all, rather the journalists whose stories were inaccurate.
I feel like we are getting off on the wrong foot here. I thought I wrote a post about how other journalists and bloggers were sensationalistic and inaccurate in their coverage. My post isn't meant as, nor should it read as, a personal attack on your hard work. As I said earlier, I'm more than happy to make updates and edits and fall on my sword with any inaccuracies. I'm even happy to post our email exchange.
Be well!


From: Jerome Radcliffe

Anytime you publish, blog or newspaper, you should be responsible for the content. There is no difference between a trained journalist and a blogger. You can't duck your own criticism of responsible reporting because you feel like your [sic] just a random blogger. The fact you are so critical of my work, you have been getting a lot of press. Your article was in the Slashdot headline, which is one of the most popular sites on the Internet. The fact is your article was highly critical of my work, and highly inaccurate. Even after I specifically told you about the inaccuracies in your writing you have not corrected them.
It's really hard for me not to be offended in this case. For the last three days I have had to answer people's questions, many have cited your article based from the Slashdot coverage.

来自:杰罗姆·拉德克利夫

我可以*破坏胰岛素泵。 我可以暂停它,远程更改所有设置。 我是在舞台上做的。 我对您没有验证文章中的任何信息感到非常失望。 人们确实死于低血糖症。 这是一个极端的例子吗? 是。 它一定是。 需要对这些设备进行安全缺陷研究。 谈论为什么有人可能会入侵泵的做法是错误的。


来自:斯科特·汉瑟曼(Scott Hanselman)

很抱歉,我只找到了我链接的文章,以及说您没有的摘要。 我试图尽我所能向Google验证所有内容。 您能给我发送一些更新的链接,然后我会更新我的帖子吗? 我的帖子是对新闻报道的分析,而不是对攻击的分析。 向我发送新信息?

谢谢!


来自:杰罗姆·拉德克利夫

我了解你的立场。 但是作为博客作者/新闻发布者,一定要负责发布事实。 你冒充虚伪地指责媒体对被泵杀死的糖尿病患者不准确,并在我的研究中写了一篇充满错误的文章。 1.有一个使用1.5v电池运行两年的CGM。 您声明我的研究是错误的。 它不是。 2.在拉斯维加斯的网站上查看CBS。 他们有演示的视频。 多家媒体报道了该演示。 我的名字很独特,我的电子邮件地址很容易获得。 我宁愿让您与我联系以进行澄清,而不是发表对我的研究的批评,但这一批评远非准确的。


来自:斯科特·汉瑟曼(Scott Hanselman)

我敢肯定,我们可以达成共识,一个随机的博客作者和一个训练有素的记者肯定是不同的。 我当然想改善职位并增加事实,并且对此感到非常高兴。 我不确定在帖子中我在哪里说“您的研究是错误的”,但我将对其进行重新检查。 再说一次,我的大部分帖子都是来自实际记者的报价,这些记者大概采访了你,我引用了它们。 我还引用了您的黑帽子摘要。 我想在Twitter上搜索Jay和Jerome Radcliffe,但找不到您,也找不到您的博客,因为新的链接和故事泛滥,我想。 此CGM可以运行2年而无需充电吗? 也许我对语义感到困惑。 我有一些CGM,约1.5V,所有带有嵌入式电池的CGM需要充电。 我会检查一下。 但是,我的主张再一次根本不是针对您,而是那些故事不准确的记者。 我觉得我们在这里走错了脚。 我以为我写了一篇文章,讲述其他记者和博客作者如何耸人听闻且报道不准确。 我的帖子既不是对您的辛勤工作的人身攻击,也不应该视为对您的辛勤工作的人身攻击。 就像我之前说的,我非常乐意进行更新和编辑,并发现任何不准确之处都会落在我的剑上。 我什至很高兴发布我们的电子邮件交流。 好吧!


来自:杰罗姆·拉德克利夫

无论何时发布,博客或报纸,您都应对内容负责。 受过训练的记者和博客作者之间没有区别。 您不能回避自己对负责任报告的批评,因为您感觉自己(原文如此)只是一个随机博客。 您对我的工作如此批评,因此您获得了很多报刊。 您的文章位于Slashdot标题中,该标题是Internet上最受欢迎的网站之一。 事实是您的文章对我的工作非常批评,而且非常不准确。 即使在我特别告诉您有关您的写作中的错误之后,您也没有纠正它们。 在这种情况下,我很难不被冒犯。 在过去的三天内,我不得不回答人们的问题,很多人都根据Slashdot的报道引用了您的文章。



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关于斯科特(About Scott)

Scott Hanselman is a former professor, former Chief Architect in finance, now speaker, consultant, father, diabetic, and Microsoft employee. He is a failed stand-up comic, a cornrower, and a book author.

斯科特·汉塞尔曼(Scott Hanselman)是前教授,前金融首席架构师,现在是演讲者,顾问,父亲,糖尿病患者和Microsoft员工。 他是一位失败的单口相声漫画家,一个玉米种植者和一本书的作者。

黑客免杀攻防_黑客可以在半英里外使用胰岛素泵杀死糖尿病患者-嗯,不。 事实与新闻恐惧之间的冲突...
黑客免杀攻防_黑客可以在半英里外使用胰岛素泵杀死糖尿病患者-嗯,不。 事实与新闻恐惧之间的冲突...
黑客免杀攻防_黑客可以在半英里外使用胰岛素泵杀死糖尿病患者-嗯,不。 事实与新闻恐惧之间的冲突...
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黑客免杀攻防_黑客可以在半英里外使用胰岛素泵杀死糖尿病患者-嗯,不。 事实与新闻恐惧之间的冲突...

翻译自: https://www.hanselman.com/blog/hackers-can-kill-diabetics-with-insulin-pumps-from-a-half-mile-away-um-no-facts-vs-journalistic-fear-mongering

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